Quantifying Religion:
Toward Building More Effective Ways
of Measuring Religious Influence
on State-Level Behavior

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With the beginning of the new millennium, it is becoming clear that religion, despite predictions of its demise[1] and the fact that it is

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1. Modernization and secularization theory both predict the demise of religion in the modern era. While the details of these bodies of theory differ, there is agreement on the following points: a new modern, secular, and scientific society is in the process of replacing the old traditional religious society of the past; modern institutions based on the new secular, scientific arrangement are replacing traditional social institutions; these new institutions are supplanting the old ones in their roles of providing legitimacy, determining social norms and explaining the world; and, due to modernization, traditional society, including religion, is becoming less and less relevant to society and politics. For a survey of the literature on modernization which is found mostly in political science, see, among others, Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds. Gabiel Almond and James C. Coleman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953); A. Foster-Carter, "The Sociology of Development," in *Sociology: New Directions*, ed. M. Haralambos (Ormskirk: Causeway, 1985); A. Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations," *World Politics* 17 (October 1964): 157-81; J. Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization* (New York: John Wiley, 1972); V.

commonly ignored in some academic circles,[2] continues to have a
strong influence on a wide range of political and social phenomena.
Despite this, quantitative cross-sectional studies of the influence of re-
ligion on politically and socially important phenomena are less common
than one would expect and tend to focus on the influence of religion on
various forms of conflict.[3] This is especially true of studies focusing on
state-level behavior. One reason for this is the lack of data on the topic
which, in turn, is at least partially due to the lack of an effective means

Randall and R. Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction
to Third World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1985); W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959);
Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970);
Donald E. Smith, ed., *Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World* (New York:
Free Press, 1971); Donald E. Smith, ed., *Religion and Political Modernization* (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); and Frank Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative
Politics," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, eds. Harry Eckstein and
David Apter (New York: Macmillan, 1968). This literature is largely from the political sci-
ence discipline and focuses on ethnicity but is also applied to religion. Secularization theory
is based in sociology, focuses on religion, and is discussed in more detail later in this work.
For a discussion of why these theories are flawed, see Jonathan Fox, "The Salience of Relig-
ious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3 (Au-
tumn 1997): 2-4; and his *Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century* (Lanham,
Md.: Lexington, 2002): 31-64.
2.   For instance, Jonathan Fox, "Religion: An Oft Overlooked Element of International
Studies," *International Studies Review* 3 (Fall 2001): 53-73; Daniel Philpott, "The Challenge
of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations," *World Politics* 55 (October
2002): 66-95; and Vendulka Kabalkova, "Towards and International Political Theology," *Mil-
lennium* 29 (2000): 675, argue that the discipline of international relations has ignored relig-
ion. David Carment and Patrick James eds., *Wars in the Midst of Peace* (Pittsburgh, Pa.:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), similarly argue that international relations theory
largely ignores primordial factors and when it does deal with such issues, it does so
inadequately.
3.   Fox, "The Salience of Religious Issues"; Jonathan Fox, "Do Religious Institutions Sup-
port Violence or the Status Quo?," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22 (1999): 119-39;
Jonathan Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnore-
ligious Minorities," *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (1999): 289-307; Jonathan Fox, "Is Islam
More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Con-
flict," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6 (Summer 2000): 1-23; Jonathan Fox, "Religious
Causes of Ethnic Discrimination," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (September 2000):
425-50; Jonathan Fox, "The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethnic Protest and Re-
bellion," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 20 (Autumn 2000): 16-43; and Rudolph J. Rummel, "Is
Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?" *Journal of Peace Research* 34 (1997):
163-75, explore the role of religion in ethnic conflict. Manus I. Midlarsky, "Democracy and
Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace," *International
Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998): 458-511, examines whether Islam is compatible with democ-
racy; and Errol A. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States,
and the Onset of War, 1820-1989," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (October 1997): 649-
68, explores the role of religion in international conflict. The shortcomings of these studies
are discussed later in this work. There are also numerous survey-based studies examining
the influence of religion on myriad social phenomena, many of which are discussed later in
this work.

of quantifying religion. That is, it is difficult to include the influence of religion in cross-sectional studies without a practical way to measure it.

Accordingly, it is the goal of this study to begin the process of developing practical variables that can measure religion, or at least aspects of religion, for purposes of use in cross-sectional analyses using state level data. In order to accomplish this goal, this study proceeds in several steps. First, it assesses the various political and social phenomena over which religion is believed to have an influence. This is useful, among other reasons, because an understanding of the factors with which religion variables may be correlated should help to provide a better understanding of what type of religion variables need to be developed. Additionally, this discussion is useful as a documentation of the wide ranging influence of religion that is still denied by some.[4] Second, this study assesses past attempts at measuring religion in the context of the theoretical issues and practical limitations concerning its measurement. Third, several indirect indicators for the connection between religion and the state are developed. The attempt here is to establish a more substantial foundation for the identification and usage of religion variables in studies of political and social behavior.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHENOMENA

The influence of religion can be found in many aspects of politics and society. In fact, religion is considered by many to be an inseparable and integral component of politics and society. For instance, S.N. Eisenstadt argues that religion is and has always been one of the "premises" of civilization, making it an essential element in political processes and social change.[5] Andreas Osiander argues that it can act as a political and psychological cement that binds society together.[6] Some, like Brian S. Turner, go as far as to argue that religion can not be understood except "by concentrating on its social role in uniting the community behind a common set of rituals and beliefs."[7]

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4.   See note 2.
5.   S.N. Eisenstadt, "Religion and the Civilizational Dimensions of Politics," in *The Political Dimensions of Religion*, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (New York: State University Press of New York, 1993), 13-41.
6.   Andreas Osiander, "Religion and Politics in Western Civilization: The Ancient World as Matrix and Mirror of the Modern," *Millennium* 29 (2000): 761-90.
7.   Brian S. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 1991), 15. In addition, many argue that the world is currently experiencing a resurgence of religion. See, for example, John L. Esposito, "Religion and Global Affairs: Political Challenges," *SAIS Review* (Summer-Fall, 1998): 20; Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); and Scott M. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural

Perhaps, one of the most important influences of religion on society is its ability to bolster or undermine the legitimacy of governments, opposition groups, and most other types of social or political institutions and movements. Religion is potentially a major source of legitimacy for both the establishment and those who oppose it. Gunther Lewy refers to this as the "double edged sword" of religion, which can be used to both support government and to revolt against it.[8] Jonathan Fox and Anthony Gill argue that the use of religious legitimacy to support or oppose a regime is often based on the level of perceived threat to the religion.[9] Dwight B. Billings and Shauna L. Scott document both of these trends in the United States, arguing that religion in the U.S. has evolved from being perceived as supporting the status-quo to being in opposition to the secular bases of morality that are a major element of the current status-quo.[10] Hank Johnston and Jozef Figa similarly argue that the greater a state's needs for the legitimacy granted by religion, the more religious institutions are able to effectively oppose the state.[11] Others argue that this has occurred in much of the third world where the failure of secular governments guided by secular ideologies has led to a crisis of legitimacy that has facilitated the ability of religious movements to oppose them.[12] Despite this, it is important to remember that religion, like any other factor, is likely to add to a state's or opposition movement's legitimacy only to the extent that it is perceived as an acceptable and capable means of resolving those issues that divide society.[13]

Pseudo-Marxist analyses acknowledge the connection between religion and legitimacy, arguing that just as ruling classes use religious

Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000).
8.   Gunther Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (New York: Oxford, 1974): 550-51.
9.   Fox, "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?"; and Anthony Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
10.   Dwight B. Billings, and Shauna L. Scott, "Religion and Political Legitimation," *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994): 173-201.
11.   Hank Johnston and Jozef Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives on Mobilization Against Authoritarian Regimes," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27 (1988): 32-34.
12.   See, for example, Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics*; Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1993); Mark Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State," *Comparative Politics* 27 (1995): 379-91; Vali Nasr, "Religion and Global Affairs: Secular States and Religious Oppositions," *SAIS Review* (Summer-Fall, 1998): 32-37; Emile Sahliyeh, ed., *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990); and Bassam Tibi, "Post-Bipolar Disorder in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam," *Millennium* 29 (2000): 843-59.
13.   Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963).

ideology to maintain their dominance, those opposing the ruling classes often develop new interpretations of religion in order to facilitate their opposition.[14] Lincoln similarly argues that religions supporting the status-quo are often challenged by other religions or new interpretations of the dominant faith supporting revolutions.[15] An interesting example of this is liberation theology. This interpretation of Christianity found mostly in Latin America combines Catholic and Marxist beliefs in order to explain the squalid living conditions of Latin America's poor, granting religious legitimacy to their desire for social justice.[16]

However, religious legitimacy is not important only in the absence of secular sources of legitimacy. Even when the legitimation of state power rests on ideologies like nationalism, pursuit of democracy, humanitarian values, etc., a "strong residual element of religion, which clearly exists even in western societies, can still perform basic legitimizing or oppositional functions within such ideologies."[17] Many others make similar arguments. Geertz argues that "political authority still requires a cultural framework in which to define itself and advance its claims."[18] Turner argues that this religious element of legitimacy is, in fact, necessary for a government to maintain its normative foundation. In addition to religion's role in legitimation, it should be recognized that there are generally two sides to the eternal conflict between the status-quo and those who oppose it.[19] Luttwak argues that religious legitimacy can be used to facilitate conflict resolution by making concessions seem like deference to religion, thus reducing the vulnerability of leaders to accusations of weakness.[20]

14. See, for example, Dwight B. Billings, "Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* 96 (July 1990): 1-31.
15. Bruce Lincoln, ed. *Religion, Rebellion and Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1985).
16. Phillip Berryman, *Liberation Theology* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1987); Michael Dodson, "The Politics of Religion in Revolutionary Nicaragua," *Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science* 483 (1986): 36-49; John R. Pottenger, "Liberation Theology: Its Methodological Foundation for Violence," in *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, 2nd ed., eds. David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 99-123; and H. Mark Roelofs, "Liberation Theology: The Recovery of Biblical Radicalism," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1988): 549-66.
17. Nikos Kokosalakis, "Legitimation, Power and Religion in Modern Society," *Sociological Analysis* 46 (1985): 371.
18. Clifford Geertz, "Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power" in *Culture and its Creators*, eds J. Ben-David & C. Nichols Clark (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1977), 267-68.
19. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*, 178-98.
20. Edward, Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17-18; Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Miroslav Volf,

In addition to being a source of legitimacy or other form of support for political factions, religion, in some instances, can be the source of the divisions between those factions and a major influence on political opinions. Raphael K. Badal argues that this is the case in Sudan where political life is dominated by religious parties.[21] Rhys H. Williams argues that this is because "religion forms deeply held values that are the basis for more ephemeral political attitudes."[22] Several empirical studies bear out this assertion. These studies found the following: that religious identification, or the lack thereof, influences individual attitudes toward issues including abortion, working women, capital punishment, confidence in institutions, and support for religion in politics;[23] that one's religious denomination influences one's attitude toward issues of morality, lifestyle, and tolerance of diversity;[24] that religiosity influences attitudes toward authoritarianism;[25] and that someone who considers religion as an end in itself rather than a means to other ends is less likely to engage in conflict over social issues.[26] Also, many argue that religion is an important source of people's worldviews, which clearly influence their political opinions.[27]

"Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: The Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment," *Millennium* 29 (2000): 861-77, similarly discuss how religion can be used to support peace. See Said Amir Arjomand, ed., *The Political Dimensions of Religion* (New York: State University Press of New York, 1993), 45; Fox "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities"; Kenneth Westhus, "The Church in Opposition," *Sociological Analysis* 37 (1976): 299-314; and Bryan R. Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 33-34, similarly discuss the importance of religious legitimacy.

21.   Raphael K. Badal, "Religion and Conflict in the Sudan: A Perspective," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21 (1990): 263-64.

22.   Rhys H. Williams, "Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35 (1996): 369.

23.   Bernadette C. Hayes, "The Impact of Religious Identification on Political Attitudes: An International Comparison," *Sociology of Religion* 56 (1995): 177-94.

24.   Alan S. Miller, "The Influence of Religious Affiliation on the Clustering of Social Attitudes," *Review of Religious Research* 37 (March 1996): 123-36.

25.   Gary K. Leak and Brandy A. Randall, "Clarification of the Link Between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Religiousness: The Role of Religious Maturity," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34 (1995): 245-52.

26.   Michael E. Nielson and Jim Fultz, "Further Examination of the Relationships of Religious Orientation to Religious Conflict," *Review of Religious Research* 36 (June 1995): 369-81.

27.   See, for example, Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew M. Greely, *Religion: A Secular Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1982); Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War*; Kablakova, "Towards an International Political Theology"; and Richard Wentz, *Why People Do Bad Things in the Name of Religion* (Macon Ga.: Mercer, 1987). Kent Greenwalt, *Religious Convictions and Political Choice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), argues that we can determine that religion influences personal opinions if: a person is certain he would change his opinion if he disregarded his religious convictions; if, when questioned about the "whys" of his beliefs, a person reveals religious premises

Religion is often a significant influence on terrorism, which is, among other things, an extreme form of political expression. C.M.J. Drake includes religion as one of many sources of the ideologies which are used to define terrorists' political aims.[28] Mark Juergensmeyer similarly notes that "what is distinctive about the international terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s is this combination of politics and religion."[29] Bruce Hoffman and David C. Rapoport take this one step further and argue that religion and nationalism have been the only major justifications for terror this century; moreover, before the advent of nationalism, religion was the only justification.[30] Hoffman argues that terrorists relying on religious motivations and justifications behave differently from those relying on secular ones and he lists several such differences. First, for secular terrorists, violence is a means to an end, for religious terrorists it can be the end itself. Second, while secular terrorists usually are trying to influence an outside audience, religious terrorists often care about no audience but themselves. Third, while secular terrorists usually see themselves as part of a system they must change, religious terrorists generally see themselves as outside of a system they must replace, allowing for greater levels of destruction.[31] Magnus Ranstorp and Rapoport make several similar arguments. First, the religious belief that a messianic event is imminent can justify greater violence than most secular beliefs. Second, religious terrorists focus on the past, trying to recreate the conditions believed to exist at the founding time of their religion, while secular terrorists generally focus on creating a new future. Third, while secular terrorists can change their ends, religious terrorists are more restricted in this by their doctrines. Fourth, religious concepts of martyrdom make suicide attacks more likely. Fifth, both the timing and targets of religious terrorists usually have religious significance.[32] Richard C. Martin similarly argues that modern

for those opinions; and if the abandonment of religious convictions would cause a person to seriously reconsider his position.

28.   C.J.M. Drake, "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10 (1998): 53-85.

29.   Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror Mandated by God," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9 (Summer 1997): 17.

30.   Bruce Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18 (1995): 272; and David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 659. Rapoport describes three pre-modern terrorist movements: the Thugs in India, the Assassins of Persia and Syria, and the Zealots in ancient Israel.

31.   Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative."

32.   Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," *Journal of International Affairs* 50 (1996): 41-60; David C. Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics* 20 (January 1988): 195-213; and David C. Rapoport, "Sacred Terror: A Contempo-

secular terror determines its own justifications, means, and limits but in holy terror, these things are determined by religious law and foundation myths.[33] Robert Kennedy argues that one's religious perspective influences what one considers terrorism.[34]

Not only is religion posited to influence terrorism, it is also posited to influence all forms of conflict. David Henderson, in a quantitative study, demonstrates that religion has an influence on international conflict.[35] Little demonstrates that religion is a source of discrimination, one of the major causes of domestic conflict.[36] Fox demonstrates the influence of religion on domestic conflict in general, and ethnic conflict specifically.[37] Rummel connects religious diversity and ethnic conflict.[38] Helen Fein argues that religious ideologies are among those that can justify genocide[39] and Osiander links the evolution of Christian theology to the concept of cleansing.[40] Many argue that violence is a major component of religion.[41] Religion in its millennarian form is a source of

rary Example from Islam" in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 103-30.

33.   Richard C. Martin, "The Study of Religion and Violence," in *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, 2nd ed., eds. David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 356-57.

34.   Robert Kennedy, "Is One Person's Terrorist Another's Freedom Fighter? Western and Islamic Approaches to 'Just War' Compared," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11 (1999): 1-21.

35.   Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989."

36.   David Little, "Religious Militancy" in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 79-91; David Little, "Studying 'Religious Human Rights': Methodological Foundations," in *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*, eds. John D. van der Vyver and John Witte Jr. (Boston, Mass.: Martinus Njhoff, 1996), 45-77; David Little, *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

37.   Fox, "The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study"; Fox, "The Effects of Religion on Domestic Conflict," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10 (Winter 1998): 43-63; Fox, "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-religious Conflict," *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (October 1999): 431-63; and Fox, *Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century*.

38.   Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?"

39.   Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," *Current Sociology* 38 (Spring 1990): 46.

40.   Osiander, "Religion and Politics in Western Civilization: The Ancient World as Matrix and Mirror of the Modern," 785.

41.   Mark Juergensmeyer, "Sacrifice and Cosmic War," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (1991): 101-17; Rene Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); David Rapoport, "Some General Observations on Religion and Violence," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (1991): 118-39; and Steve Zitrin, "Milleniarianism and Violence," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 12 (1998): 110-15.

violence.[42] Christianity, under some circumstances, has been linked to intolerant attitudes.[43] Christian fundamentalism in the U.S. has been shown to provoke negative reactions against it.[44] Finally, George Weigel argues that not only can religion be a source of conflict, it can also be a source of peace.[45]

Another important form of political action which is influenced by religion is mobilization, or organizing for political activities.[46] There are several ways in which religious organizations can facilitate mobilization. First, regimes are often more reluctant to restrict the activities of religious organizations. In fact, under autocratic regimes, they are often the only legal place for people to meet in large groups outside of government-run forums.[47] Second, religious organizations tend to have good access to the media and often have their own media, which is in many cases the only uncensored media under authoritarian regimes.[48] Third, religious organizations are able to bridge differences between diverse populations and classes which may not have been able to successfully combine their efforts under other circumstances.[49] Fourth, religious organizations provide a ready-made framework for mobilization including places to meet, membership lists, educational institutions, and trained leaders.[50] Fifth, religious institutions are often the strongest in-

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42. Lewy, *Religion and Revolution*; Rapoport, "Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam," 120; Rapoport, "Some General Observations on Religion and Violence," 131; Maxwell Taylor, *The Fanatics* (London: Brassey's, UK, 1991), 121-55; and Zitrin, "Milleniarianism and Violence."

43. Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, "Denominational Preference and the Dimensions of Political Tolerance," *Sociological Analysis* 51 (1990): 68, 78-79; and Kenneth D. Wald, *Religion and Politics in the United States* (New York: St. Martins, 1987), 267-69.

44. Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, "Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and Antipathy Toward Christian Fundamentalists," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (1999): 29-61; and Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, "The Anti-Christian Fundamentalist Factor in Contemporary Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (1999): 508-42.

45. George Weigel, "Religion and Peace: An Argument Complexified," in *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era*, eds. Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1992), 172-92.

46. It is important to note that these activities may be peaceful and legal or violent and illegal.

47. Johnston and Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition," 35-37; and Barry Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, eds. Johnston and Sampson, 31.

48. Johnston and Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition," 36-37; and Jeffrey E. Hadden, "Religious Broadcasting and the Mobilization of the New Christian Right," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 26 (1987): 5-6.

49. Johnston and Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition," 38.

50. Sahliyeh, ed., *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, 13; Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs," 31-32; Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities At Risk* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 69; and Hadden, "Religious Broadcasting and the Mobilization of the New Christian Right," 5-6.

stitutions in states with weak governments.[51] Sixth, religious organiza-
tions often have international support, drawing on resources of sister
religious institutions in other countries or international ecumenical or-
ganizations.[52] Seventh, Fox demonstrates that religious institutions in-
fluence mobilization for ethnic conflict.[53]

Religion can be a source of identity, which influences all forms of
political and social activities. Jefferey R. Seul argues that "no other re-
positories of cultural meaning have historically offered so much in re-
sponse to the human need to develop a secure identity. Consequently,
religion often is at the core of individual and group identity"[54] David
Little and Liliane Voye similarly argue that religion can be an impor-
tant source of group identity.[55] David Carment, Patrick James and Ted
R. Gurr argue that this is also the case for ethnic identity.[56] Smith ar-
gues that religion is an important source of national identity[57] and Ju-
ergensmeyer contends that nationalism and religion serve the same
social functions and that western nationalist ideologies are really just a
cover for Christianity.[58] Finally, Daniel Philpott argues that religion
was the source of the modern Westphalian state system itself.[59]

Religion also influences many other factors that many believe are
important aspects of politics and society. Samuel P. Huntington's con-
cept of civilizations is, to a great extent, based on religion.[60] Religion

51.   Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs," 31.
52.   Ibid.
53.   Fox, "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?"
54.   Jefferey R. Seul, "'Ours is the Way of God': Religion, Identity and Intergroup Con-
flict," *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (1999): 558.
55.   Little, *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance*; and Liliane Voye, "Secularization in a Con-
text of Advanced Modernity," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 275-88.
56.   David Carment and Patrick James, "Escalation of Ethnic Conflict," *International Polit-
ics* 35 (1998): 68; and Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, 3.
57.   Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of
Nationalist Deals," *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (1999): 331-55; and Anthony D. Smith, "The
Sacred Dimension of Nationalism," *Millennium* 29 (2000): 791-814.
58.   Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War*; and his "The New Religious State."
59.   Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations," *World
Politics* 52 (2000): 206-45.
60.   Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 22-49;
Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War," *For-
eign Affairs* 72 (1993): 186-94; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); and Samuel P. Hunt-
ington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996): 28-46. Huntington
divides the world into eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic,
Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and "possibly" African. All of these civilizations,
save one, are wholly or partially defined by religion. The Islamic and Hindu civilizations
bear the name of the religions which appear to be their sole defining trait. The Confucian/
Sinic civilization includes Confucianism, and by inference Buddhism. The West is, in part,
defined by "the effects of the Reformation and . . . [its] combined Catholic and Protestant

influences international diplomacy,[61] democracy,[62] the family,[63] environmentalism,[64] perceptions of the nature of human rights,[65] public school policy,[66] and economics.[67] Some, like Viet Bader argue that religion influences even those democratic states which supposedly enshrine separation of religion and the state as an aspect of liberalism.[68] Finally, religious fundamentalism has become an important political phenomenon.[69]

cultures" See Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 46. The Slavic-Orthodox civilization is based, in part, upon the Orthodox branch of Christianity that was shielded from Western Christianity and had "limited exposure" to important religious and historical experiences, including the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment. See Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 45-46. Latin American culture is distinguished from the West, in part, by the fact that it is primarily Catholic. The Japanese civilization has a distinct religious tradition including Shintoism. The African civilization is the only one which has no obvious religious component. See S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities,'" *Millennium* 29 (2000): 591; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue," *Millennium* 29 (2000): 614; Carsten B. Laustsen and Ole Waever, "In Defense of Religion: Sacred referent Objects for Securitization," *Millennium* 29 (2000): 705; Smith, "The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism," 791; and Tibi, "Post-Bipolar Disorder in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam," 844, which similarly argue that Huntington's concept of civilizations is based on religion.

61.   Johnston and Sampson, *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*.

62.   Midlarsky, "Democracy and Islam"; T.K. Oommen, "Religious Nationalism and Democratic Polity: The Indian Case," *Sociology of Religion* 55 (1994): 455-72; and Fox, "The Effects of Religion on Domestic Conflict," 58-59.

63.   Helen Hardacre, "The Impact of Fundamentalisms on Women, the Family, and Interpersonal Relations," in *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 129-50.

64.   Bron Taylor, "Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! To the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10 (1998): 1-42.

65.   Johan D. Van der Vyver, "Religious Fundamentalism and Human Rights," *Journal of International Affairs* 50 (1996): 21-40.

66.   Sarah V. Wayland, "Religious Expression in Public Schools: Kirpans in Canada, Hijab in France," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20 (1997): 545-61.

67.   Timur Kuran, "Fundamentalism and the Economy," in *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies and Militance*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and J. Barkley Rosser Jr., "Belief: Its Role in Thought and Action," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 52 (July 1993): 355-68.

68.   Viet Bader, "Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy," *Political Theory* 27 (1999): 597-633.

69.   For a discussion of religious fundamentalism, see, among others, *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies and Militance*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1991); *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1993); *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and *Religion and Politics in Comparative Per-*

The purpose of this discussion thus far has been to document the fact that religion influences a wide range of social and political phenomena and not to develop a theory or model of how religion does so. It is clear that this discussion is by no means an exhaustive assessment of the topic. However, it is sufficient to provide the basis for an understanding of religion's many roles in society and politics which can be used toward this work's central goal, to develop a practical means to measure religion for the purposes of a quantitative study of the topic.

PAST ATTEMPTS AT MEASURING RELIGION

The next logical step in developing practical quantitative measures of religion is to examine the measures that have been used in the past. Despite the influence of religion on political and social phenomena, it is rarely included in cross-sectional quantitative studies. When it is included, the measures tend to be crude and indirect and often only measure an individual aspect of religious influence which accounts for only a small part of the influence of religion on society. Most measures are based on religious affiliation. For example, Henderson measures whether the two states involved in an international conflict have populations that adhere to different religions.[70] Rummel, while examining domestic conflict, similarly measures the number of different religions present in a state.[71] Others use more sophisticated measures based on the number of different religions present in a state and their percentage of the population.[72]

Other measures contain a short list of factors intended to reflect some aspect of religion. Daniel E. Price measures the areas in which Islam influences law and the extent to which non-Islamic ideas are accepted in Islamic states.[73] The areas of law examined by Price are personal status, regulation of economic matters, prescribed religious practices, criminal law, and religion as a guide for government. Mark Chaves and David E. Cann provide a similar list of government involvement in religion, capturing whether: there is a single officially designated state church; there is official state recognition of some

spective: *Revival of Religious Fundamentalism in East and West*, eds. Bronislaw Misztal and Anson Shupe (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992).
70.   Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity."
71.   Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?"
72.   Robert J. Barro, *Determinants of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2002): 13-28; and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2002): 29-54.
73.   Daniel E. Price, *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999); and his "Islam and Human Rights: A Case of Deceptive First Appearances," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41 (2002): 213-25.

denominations and not others; the state appoints or approves the ap-
pointment of church leaders; the state directly pays personal salaries of
church employees; a state-run system of ecclesiastical tax collection ex-
ists; and the state directly subsidizes, beyond tax breaks, operating ex-
penses, capital, or maintenance for churches.[74] David Latin measures
whether general religious grievances are expressed by an ethnic minor-
ity.[75] While analyzing the influence of religion on ethnic conflict, Fox
develops a series of measures on religion, determining whether relig-
ious issues are more important compared to political, economic, cul-
tural, and autonomy issues. He found that an effective measure of
religious legitimacy is whether a state has an official religion. Finally,
he includes measures of specific aspects of religion including religious
discrimination and religious institutions, which are important measures
but are limited in scope.[76]

Measures of religion in survey data tend to be less crude and are
sometimes more broad in scope through measuring more central ele-
ments of religion's influence on society; however, like the cross-sec-
tional variables, they generally measure religion indirectly. Many, for
example, use church attendance as a measure of religiosity.[77] Some,
like Robert A. Campbell and James E. Curtis, ask respondents whether
they believe in things like God, the Devil, Hell, life after death, the
soul, and sin.[78] Leak and Randall measure religious tolerance using
one's willingness to question the authority of one's church and open-

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74. Mark Chaves and David E. Cann, "Religion, Pluralism and Religious Market Struc-
ture," *Rationality and Society* 4 (1992): 280.

75. David Latin, "Language Conflict and Violence: The Straw that Strengthens the
Camel's Back," *Archives Europennes De Sociologie* 41 (2000): 97-137.

76. Fox, "The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study"; Fox,
"Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?"; Fox, "The Influence of
Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities"; Fox, "Relig-
ious Causes of Ethnic Discrimination"; Fox, "The Effects of Religious Discrimination on
Ethnic Protest and Rebellion"; and Fox, *Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth
Century*.

77. See, for example, Gary T. Marx, *Protest and Prejudice* (New York: Harper and Row,
1967); Marx, "Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes,"
American Sociological Review (1967): 64-72; Jon P. Alston, Charles W. Peek, and C. Ray
Wingrove, "Religiosity and Black Militancy: A Reappraisal," *Journal for the Scientific Study
of Religion* 11 (1972): 252-61; Christopher G. Ellison, John P. Bartkowski, and Kristin L.
Anderson, "Are There Religious Variations in Domestic Violence," *Journal of Family Issues*
20 (1999): 87-113; and G. David Johnston, Mare Matre, and Gigi Armbrecht, "Race and
Religiosity: An Empirical Evaluation of a Causal Model," *Review of Religious Research* 32
(1991): 252-66.

78. Robert A. Campbell and James E. Curtis, "Religious Involvement across Societies:
Analysis for Alternative Measures in National Surveys," *Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion* 33 (1994): 215-29.

ness to other faith traditions.[79] Mariana Servin-Gonzalez and Oscar
Torres-Reyna use self-identification to identify Christian fundamental-
ists.[80] Finally, many use religious affiliation, or the lack thereof, in their
studies.[81] Bolce and De Maio combine some of these strategies to mea-
sure Christian fundamentalism by defining one as fundamentalist if her
denomination falls "within the white evangelical Protestant proposi-
tion" and agrees with the statement that "the Bible is God's Word and
all that it says is true."[82]

While some of these indicators are probably more accurate mea-
sures of religiosity than those used in the cross-sectional studies, they
are difficult to apply at the state level. That is, while one can ask a
person whether he believes in God, one can not ask a state the same
question. However, the fact that, even when using survey data where
presumably more accurate information can be collected, the measures
of religiosity tend to be indirect implies that the phenomenon of relig-
ion in its pure form probably can not be quantified.

This opens the question of what aspect of religion should be mea-
sured. The literature on secularization theory bears on this issue. Secu-
larization theory posits that religion is declining in modern times.
There continues to be a vigorous debate in sociology over whether this
is, in fact, the case. An important aspect of this debate is whether secu-
larization refers to the decline of personal religiosity or whether it re-
fers to the decline of religious influence over political institutions.
While the details of this debate are unimportant for our purposes
here,[83] it is important that the debate has identified two important as-

79. Leak and Randall, "Clarification of the Link Between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Religiousness."

80. Mariana Servin-Gonzalez and Oscar Torres-Reyna, "The Polls Trends: Religion and Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (1999): 607-08.

81. See, for example, Hayes, "The Impact of Religious Identification on Political Attitudes"; Miller, "The Influence of Religious Affiliation on the Clustering of Social Attitudes"; and Peer Scheepers and Frans Van Der Silk, "Religion and Attitudes on Moral Issues: Effects of Individual, Spouse and Parental Characteristics," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37 (1998): 678-91.

82. Bolce and De Maio, "The Anti-Christian Fundamentalist Factor in Contemporary Politics."

83. For more on this debate, see Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization* (London: Sage, 1994); Peter Beyer, "Secularization from the Perspective of Globalization: A Response to Dobbelaere," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 289-301; Karel Dobbelaere, "Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 229-47; Yves Lambert, "Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization or New Religious Forms," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 303-33; Rodney Stark, "Secularization, R.I.P.," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 249-73; William H. Swatos, Jr. and Kevin J. Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 209-28; and David Yamane, "Secularization on Trial: In Defense

pects of religion that are theoretically measurable: religiosity and the influence of religion on political and social behavior and institutions.

As noted above, information regarding religiosity, while probably a more accurate reflection of the importance of religion in a society, is considerably more difficult to collect at the state level. Survey data including information like belief in God and church attendance could theoretically be collected worldwide and averages for each state used as that state's measure of religiosity. However, this is not practical for several reasons. First, accurately surveying thousands of people in each of the world's approximately two hundred states would be prohibitively expensive. Second, there are many states with diverse populations, each of which is likely to have different levels of religiosity. Third, much of the world's population lives in inaccessible or remote regions, making it difficult to include them in a survey. Fourth, it is a well known fact that conducting surveys in authoritarian states is often not possible and when it is, the respondents are likely to be afraid to give accurate information.

Collecting data on the influence of religion on political institutions and behavior is considerably more feasible and less expensive. Sources of information including the media, academic writings, and human rights reports, among others, are available on the behavior of all governments and most major political groupings. While this form of data is indirect and based on ivory tower methods, it can provide reasonably reflective measures of the importance of religion in a given place and time. This methodology also has the advantage that it has been proven to work in studies on other topics including ethnicity[84] and democracy.[85]

<center>BUILDING MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON STATE BEHAVIOR</center>

The methods for developing the variables used here, as well as the eventual methods to be used for collecting this data, are based on the

of a Neosecularization Paradigm," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (1997): 109-22.

84. See, for example, Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel," *International Political Science Review* 12 (1993): 161-201; Gurr, *Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); and Ted R. Gurr and Will H. Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 1079-1103.

85. See, for example, Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 469-82.

Minorities at Risk project[86] that developed similar variables for ethnicity. The first step is to decide what is to be measured. Five aspects of the influence of religion on state behavior that can be measured come to mind: the number of different religions and religious denominations, the degree of separation of religion and the state, state treatment of religious minorities, government regulation of the dominant religion, and the extent to which religious laws and beliefs influence legislation. The reasoning behind using these five factors is discussed below.

It is important to emphasize at this point that none of these variables are perfect and complete measures of the influence of religion on politics. Rather, they each look at one aspect of the way religion can manifest itself. It is hoped that by combining these individual perspectives of religion in the polity that we can build a more perfect picture of the phenomenon. This methodology can be described by the parable of the three blind men feeling an elephant. One feels the trunk and believes it is a snake. Another feels a leg and believes it is a tree. The third feels the tail and believes it is a mouse. Yet anyone who can see would realize that it is an elephant.

Thus, this examination of religion is comparable to not having the organs to "see" what we would like to measure, but being able to touch it. If we touch it in enough places, we hopefully can get a better idea of what our elephant of religion looks like. In order to make sure that our picture is as accurate as possible, the shortcomings of the variables developed below are also discussed.

The second step is to develop variables which can measure these factors. The Minorities at Risk project used one of three methods for building variables on ethnicity which are also appropriate for building variables to measure religious factors. First, some variables simply measured categories, such as the type of ethnic group involved or the region in which they live. Second, the method applied developed ordinal scales for variables. Third, checklists of various specific manifestations of a factor were developed, and the sum of whether these factors were present was added. For example, political restrictions were measured by using the following list of potential political restraints, including restrictions on:

- freedom of expression
- free movement, place of residence
- rights in judicial proceedings
- political organization

86.   For more details on the Minorities at Risk project, see Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel"; Gurr, *Peoples Versus States*; and Gurr and Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s," as well as *Minorities at Risk*, available at www.cisdm.umd.edu/inscr/mar.

- voting
- recruitment to police, military
- access to civil service
- attainment of high office

One of the three methods described above is used for all of the variables listed below.

Religious Denomination

As noted above, several studies, both cross-sectional and survey-based, have in the past used differences in denomination as a measure of religion. While this variable is probably the crudest one discussed here, it is also the least subject to questions of measurement. That is, few are likely to dispute the presence of various denominations within a given state. However, it is often the case that, for various reasons, advocacy groups and governments will dispute the exact distribution of a population. This is because religious minority groups and governments may often have political motivations for overestimating or underestimating the number of followers of a minority religion living in a state, especially if religion is correlated with nationality. For this reason, whenever possible, several sources for the distribution of religious denominations within a state should be used. Several general sources like the CIA World Factbook and UN sources as well as more country-specific data from censuses, human rights groups, and academic sources should be used. Each of these sources should be assessed for biases and accuracy in order to achieve the final result.

The categories to be collected should include: among Christian groups—Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant (this will include a general coding for all Protestant groups along with, where available, listing of specific denominations), and other Christian sects as well as a category for all Christians; among Muslims—Sunni and Shi'i Muslims as well as a general category for all Muslims; and among all of the world's other denominations—Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Animism, and other religions (more specific information on religions fitting into this category will be listed on the codesheet and used to add categories to the religious denomination information collected when appropriate).

This information on religious denominations has many potential uses. First, it can be used to develop a religious diversity variable similar to the one used by Rummel which measures the number of religions present in a given state.[87] Second, it can be used to measure, as did Henderson,[88] differences in religions between states for use in

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87. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?"
88. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity."

studies involving dyads of states, such as studies of international con-
flict like those using the Correlates of War[89] or ICB datasets.[90] Third, it
can be used to determine, as did Fox, whether a specific denomination
is in the majority in a state or if a specific denomination is among that
state's minority religious groups influences political and social
processes in that state.[91]

Separation of Religion and the State

Whether a state has an official religion or not is arguably one of the
best potential indicators of the extent of religious influence on that
state's government. This is because, as Juergensmeyer notes, "if a na-
tion starts with the premise of secular nationalism, religion is often
made marginal to the political order."[92] Also, as noted above, Fox de-
termined that whether a state has an official religion is an effective
measure of the legitimacy of the use of religion in political discourse.
However, as Fox notes, the measure used in that study, which has only
two possible values, is overly simple and "could be much improved . . .
[through] the construction of a more detailed indicator of the official
relationship between church and state."[93]

W. Cole Durham, Jr. provides a framework for accomplishing this.
He posits that regimes can be divided into seven categories with re-
spect to the connection between religion and the state: (1) "established
churches," where the state endorses one or more official church; (2)
"endorsed churches," where regimes fall short of endorsing a particular
church but "acknowledge that one particular church has a special place
in the country's traditions"; (3) "cooperationist regimes," where certain
religions benefit from state support but no religion is endorsed; (4)
"accommodationist regimes," which have official separation of church
and state but behave with a benevolent neutrality toward religion; (5)
"separationist regimes," which have separation of church and state and
are slightly hostile toward religion; (6) "inadvertent insensitivity," which
describes regimes that make little distinction between regulation of re-

89.   For more details on the Correlates of War dataset, see J. David Singer, *The Correlates
of War: I Research Origins and Rationale* (New York: Free Press, 1979).
90.   For more details on the ICB dataset, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A
Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Michael
Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *Crisis, Conflict and Instability* (New York: Pergamon,
1989).
91.   Fox, "The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion."
92.   Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State," 186.
93.   Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnore-
ligious Minorities," 304-05.

ligious and other types of institutions; and (7) "hostility and overt pros-
ecution," which describes regimes that are hostile to all religions.[94]

While Durham's framework is an excellent starting point, it misses
some important factors which should be included in a variable measur-
ing separation of church and state. For example, what about states
which do not officially designate a particular religion, but in all other
respects behave as if they have one? Also, states which have official
religions may or may not ban some or all other religions within their
borders. Similarly, states without official religions may still ban some
minority religions.

Accordingly, the following set of variables, using ordinal scales,
should more accurately measure the connection between religion and
the state:

All states are coded on the following ordinal scale:

Separation of Religion and the State

0—The state has one official religion.

1—The state has more than one official religion.

2—Civil religion: While the state does not officially endorse a
religion, one religion serves unofficially as the state's civil
religion.

3—Cooperation: The state falls short of endorsing a particular
church but certain churches benefit from state support more
than others. (Such support can be monetary or legal)

4—Supportive: The state supports all religions more or less
equally.

5—Accommodation: Official separation of church and state and
the state has a benevolent or neutral attitude toward religion
in general.

6—Separationist: Official separation of church and state and the
state is slightly hostile toward religion.

7—Inadvertent Insensitivity: There is little distinction between
regulation of religious and other types of institutions.

8—Hostile: Hostility and overt prosecution of all religions. (i.e.
the former USSR)

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94. W. Cole Durham Jr., "Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework,"
in *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*, ed. John D. van der
Vyver and John Witte Jr. (Boston, Mass.: Martinus Njhoff, 1996), 1-44.

If the state has an official religion (previous variable coded as 0 or 1), the following variable is coded:

Restrictions on Minority Religions by States with Official Religions

    0—No other religions are illegal and there are no significant restrictions on other religions.

    1—No other religions are illegal but some or all other religions have practical limitations placed upon them.

    2—No other religions are illegal but some or all other religions have legal limitations placed upon them.

    3—Some other religions are illegal.

    4—All other religions are illegal.

If the state has no official religion (separation of religion and the state variable coded as 1 or higher), the following variable is coded:

Restrictions on Religions by States with no Official Religion

    0—No religions are illegal and there are no significant restrictions on any religions.

    1—No religions are illegal but some or all religions have practical limitations placed upon them

    2—No religions are illegal but some or all religions have legal limitations placed upon them.

    3—Some religions are illegal.

    4—All religions are illegal.

While the last two variables are similar, they are coded separately because states with official religions are unlikely to discriminate against the official religion while states with no official religion can potentially restrict all religions. However, the results from the two variables can be combined to form a more inclusive variable.

The variables in this category can be used as measures of religious legitimacy or separation of religion in states in any study using the state as the unit of analysis. They can be used individually as well as in combination, either as individual variables in studies using methodologies that can account for more than one independent variable or by creating composite variables.

They also have certain shortcomings. For instance, the separation of religion and state variable alone can be misleading. For instance, both England and Iran have official state religions, yet few would put them into the same category with regard to separation of religion and state. The variable for restrictions on religion helps to mitigate this as England places no significant restrictions on minority religions while Iran does, and even outlaws the Bahai religion. A second shortcoming is that this variable does a good job of depicting the overall structural relationship between religion and the state but can easily miss many of

the nuances. States with no official religions can have many religious influences on state behavior and states with official religions may otherwise be very secular. The two variables described below provide better measures of these nuances.

Discrimination Against Religious Minorities

Another potential measure of religious influence on state institutions is the extent to which a state discriminates against minority religions. Such a measure of the willingness of state institutions to use religion as a basis for discrimination indirectly measures the influence of religion on these institutions. This is because the most probable motivations for such restrictions would be religious ones. It is clear, however, that there could be other possible motivations for these restrictions. These include hostility to all religions or restricting activities that may include contact with foreign persons or institutions for reasons of national security.

This potential ambiguity is clearly a shortcoming of this variable. One cannot make the *a priori* assumption that religious discrimination is due to religious motivations, as one can if a state has an official religion. However, it is arguable that a high level of religious discrimination is correlated with the influence of religion on the political institutions which engage in this discrimination. Certainly, any multi-faceted approach to measuring the influence of religion on state behavior would be lacking if it did not take religious discrimination into account.

Fox develops a useful religious discrimination variable which is adopted for use here. This variable measures the presence of various categories of religious discrimination, adding the sum to produce a composite variable.[95] Fox identifies the following categories for his variable, to include restrictions on:

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95.   Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities"; Fox, "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-religious Conflict"; Fox, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict"; Fox, "Religious Causes of Ethnic Discrimination"; and Fox, *Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century*. Fox measures each of these variables on the following scale: 0—None; 1—The activity is slightly restricted for all group members or sharply restricted for some of them; 2—The activity is prohibited or sharply restricted for all group members. This study, however, only measures the presence or absence of these factors because coding them on this scale is deemed (based on Fox's previous experience) too arbitrary. Also, Fox's original data collection used ethnic minorities as the unit of analysis. This means that when there was more than one ethnic minority in a state, this variable was coded more than once for this state. In this study, the variable is coded only once for each state using the most severe restrictions that occur in this state because the factor being measured here is state willingness to restrict religion, not the relationship between any particular religious minority and the state. For a further discussion of religious rights, see Derek H. Davis, "Thoughts on Religious Persecution Around the Globe: Problems and Solutions," *Journal of*

- Public observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays.
- Forced observance of religious laws.
- Building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship.
- Formal religious organizations.
- The running of religious schools and/or religious education in general.
- The observance of religious laws concerning personal status, including marriage and divorce.
- The ordination of and/or access to clergy.
- Other types of observance of religious law.

In addition to these categories, Fox includes the forced observance of religious laws of other religious groups.

This study adds the following categories to this list:
- Restrictions on conversion to minority religions.
- Restrictions on access to places of worship.
- Forced conversions.
- Restrictions on proselytizing.
- Arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, and/or members of religious parties.
- Restrictions on the ability to write, publish, or disseminate religious publications.
- Restrictions on the ability to make and/or obtain materials necessary for religious rites, customs, and/or ceremonies.
- Requirement for minority religions (as opposed to all religions) to register in order to be legal or receive special tax status.

The total number of these types of restrictions on any or all religions in a state is added to produce the final religious discrimination variable. This variable can be used in any study wishing to measure the influence of religion on political institutions as well as studies investigating the extent of religious intolerance. In addition, the individual categories in this variable may be of interest to scholars focusing on those issues.

It is important to note that many would consider some items on this list more severe forms of discrimination than others and the items should be weighted accordingly. We feel that while it may be true that some of these restrictions may be more severe than others, a weighting scheme will cause more problems than it will solve. For instance, if one assumes that forced conversion is the worst form of discrimination, how much worse is it than the other forms? Twice as bad as the others? Perhaps three times as bad? Imagine trying to do this with each of the items in the list. Furthermore, even if we did so, this would only reflect

Church and State 40 (1998): 279-87; and Yoram Dinstein, "Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities," *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights* 20 (1991): 155-79.

our opinion. Others would most certainly weight the items differently. Thus, the simplest answer is to avoid the question in the first place. However, since the data on each of these items will be made available individually, any future researcher who would like to weight or even delete some of these items would be able to do so.

Regulation of the Majority Religion

Sometimes governments regulate the majority religion in their state. This is also an important form of government entanglement with religion. The variable for this phenomenon measures the following types of government regulation of the majority religion:
- Restrictions on religious political parties.
- Arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, and/or members of religious parties.
- Restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties.
- Restrictions on the public observance of religious practices, including religious holidays and the Sabbath.
- Restrictions on public religious speech, including sermons by clergy.
- Restrictions on access to places of worship.
- Restrictions on the publication or dissemination of written religious material.
- Arrest of people for religious activities.
- Restrictions on religious public gatherings that do not coincide with other types of public gatherings.
- Restrictions on the public display of religious symbols by private persons or organizations, including religious dress, nativity scenes, and icons.
- Other religious restrictions.

This variable is differentiated from the previous one in that it represents treatment of all religions and/or the majority religion rather than discrimination against minority religions. It is more likely to represent hostility toward religion in general by a state or fear of religious-based opposition. However, it can also represent government dislike of any basis for organization other than official state institutions. Thus, as is the case with the previous variable, it is not possible to make the *a priori* assumption that government regulation of the majority religion is due to religious motivations, but no panel of data on religion and the state would be complete without such a variable.

Religious Legislation

Another way to indirectly measure the influence of religion on state institutions is to observe the extent to which religious laws, traditions, and biases are codified in state legislation. Unlike the religious discrimination variable, there are few reasons to think that religious laws, traditions, and biases would be legislated as state law for any reason other than to affect religious influence on legislators. Religious legislation is measured here by three variables, one measuring the extent of religious legislation, one measuring specific types of religious legislation, and one measuring whether any existing religious legislation is enforced.

As is the case with the discrimination variable, we do not weight these items but the dataset will allow others to do so if they wish.

Extent of Religious Legislation: This variable measures on the following ordinal scale the extent to which a states law is covariant with religious law:

0—No religious laws are legislated as law.
1—Most aspects of the law are secular but there are some isolated instances of religious legislation.
2—A substantial portion of the state's laws are religious or state law is based in great part on religious law but is not 100 percent religious law.
3—State law is religious law.

This variable is crude, as it is difficult to produce an exact percentage of laws which are religious. The variable below provides a more dynamic measure.

Specific Types of Religious Legislation: This variable measures the presence of specific types of religious legislation. This refers to actual laws, not societal practice. The variable identified here constitutes a much expanded version of the type of variable collected by Price and Chaves and Cann.[96] The presence of each of the following categories is assessed and the result is totaled to form the final variable:

• Dietary laws (restrictions on the production, import, selling, or consumption of specific foods other than alcoholic beverages).
• Restrictions or prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages.
• Personal status defined by clergy (i.e. marriage, divorce, and/or burial can only occur under religious auspices.)

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96. It should also be noted that these studies only collected their variables for a small number of states. Price, *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights*; and his "Islam and Human Rights: A Case of Deceptive First Appearances," collected his variable for forty-six states; Chaves and Cann, "Religion, Pluralism and Religious Market Structure," 280, collected their variables for eighteen states.

- Laws of inheritance defined by religion.
- Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion.
- Restrictions on interfaith marriages.
- Restrictions on public dress.
- Blasphemy laws, or any other restriction on speech about religion or religious figures.
- Censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being anti-religious.
- Mandatory closing of some or all businesses during religious holidays, including the Sabbath or its equivalent.
- Other restrictions on activities during religious holidays including the Sabbath or its equivalent (e.g. "blue laws").*
- Religious education as standard in public schools. (Code also if it is possible to opt out of this.)
- Mandatory religious education in public schools. (Code if all students must have some form of religious education; non-religious ethics or philosophy courses do not count as religious education. If this category is coded, also code the above category).
- Government funding of religious schools or religious educational programs in secular schools.
- Government funding of religious charitable organizations.
- Government collection of taxes on behalf of religious organizations (religious taxes).
- Official government positions, salaries, or other funding for clergy.
- Funding for religious organizations or activities other than those listed above.*
- Clergy and/or speeches in places of worship require government approval.
- Some official clerical positions made by government appointment.
- Presence of an official government ministry or department dealing with religious affairs.
- Certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious position (i.e. as in Iran).
- Certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by virtue of their political office (i.e. the Queen of England is also head of Anglican Church).
- Some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order to hold office (this excludes positions in religious ministries, head of state church, or the like).
- Presence of religious courts which have jurisdiction over some matters of law.

- Seats in legislative branch and/or cabinet are by law or custom granted, at least in part, along religious lines.
- Prohibitive restrictions on abortion.
- The presence of religious symbols on the state's flag.
- Religion listed on state identity cards.
- Religious organizations must register with government in order to obtain official status.
- Presence of an official government body which monitors "sects" or minority religions.
- Restrictions on women other than those listed above (i.e. restrictions on education, jobs that they can hold, or on appearing in public without a chaperone).*
- Other religious prohibitions or practices that are mandatory.*

In the above list, there are four categories marked with an asterisk (*). These categories are designed to cover types of religious restrictions not anticipated by this study. When any of these categories is coded, the specifics of the legislation involved will be noted. If a particular type of legislation occurs in several states, it will be added to the list as a new category.

As is the case with the discrimination variable, we do not weigh these items but the dataset will allow others to do so if they wish.

Enforcement

It is often the case that religious legislation exists "on the books" but is not or is rarely enforced in practice. This can occur because the laws are historical artifacts or because while the state prefers to have the laws "on the books" for political reasons, there is no political will to enforce them or there are practical reasons for declining to enforce them. Whatever the reason for its existence, the presence or absence of a political will to enforce existing religious legislation measures another aspect of the influence of religion on state institutions. Accordingly, a variable measuring this is coded on the following ordinal scale:

0—No substantial restrictions exist (coded only if the religious legislation variable is coded as 0).
1—While the laws are on the books, in practice they are rarely enforced.
2—Some of the above restrictions are enforced but not others or all of them are enforced sporadically.
3—All the above restrictions are enforced strictly.

A final category of "no basis for judging" will also be included in cases where information on enforcement is not available.

These religious legislation variables can be used in order to measure the influence of religion or religious legitimacy within a state in any study using the state as the unit of analysis. These variables can be used individually as well as in combination, either as individual variables in studies using methodologies that can account for more than one independent variable or by creating composite variables. In addition, the individual categories in the variable measuring specific types of religious legislation may be of interest to scholars focusing on those issues.

Like the religious discrimination variable, this variable focuses on a specific manifestation of religion in the polity. It is likely correlated with the structural separation of religion and state but as is shown by the cases of England and Iran, in which both have official religions but one clearly has more religious legislation, the two are not the same thing.

CONCLUSIONS

While the variables developed here are individually incomplete, in combination they provide a good picture of the extent of separation between religion and state. They account for religious diversity, specific denomination, the structural separation of religion and state, treatment of religious minorities, regulation of the majority religion, and the extent to which state law is religious law. These aspects of religion in the polity arguably provide a good approximation of the actual separation of religion and state; however, they are clearly not perfect. The issue of weighting the individual items of the religious discrimination and legislation variables, much less combining the five major variables, is a difficult one.

Be that as it may, these variables are likely the best practical variables that can be developed to measure the influence of religion on state institutions. This is due to limitations on what can possibly be measured and what can practically be measured given limited resources and information. Thus, in a sense, we remain blind men trying to figure out what an elephant looks like.

Even with these limitations, however, it is argued that the variables developed here can be useful both in the study of the influence of religion on political and social phenomena and as control variables in studies focusing on other issues. That Fox found that a simple separation of church and state variable having only two categories was useful in his study on the influence of religious legitimacy on ethnic conflict implies that the more sophisticated variables developed here should

prove even more useful.[97] Also, that meaningful results were extracted from Rummel's use of a religious diversity variable in his study of ethnic conflict[98] and Henderson's use of differences in religious denominations, has similar implications.[99] In addition, these variables have the advantages of being reasonably accurate, practical to collect, and transparent.

The variables developed here have many potential uses. First, they can be used to simply assess the presence of religious influence on political institutions on a worldwide basis, controlling for factors like region, the economy, and democracy. This would allow for an assessment of assumptions as, for example, made by many scholars that religion is particularly important in the Middle East and other Islamic states,[100] and that it is less important in modern, democratic states.[101] While the author does not necessarily endorse these assumptions, they are clearly present in some academic, political, and media circles, making an objective and quantitative assessment of them appropriate and perhaps even obligatory.

Second, these variables could be used to more accurately assess the influence of religion on the many political factors with which it is believed to be associated. Based on the discussion provided earlier in this study, these include: state legitimacy, the legitimacy of opposition to the state, political divisions, political opinions, terrorism, discrimination, genocide, "ethnic" or other "cleansing," international conflict, domestic conflict, ethnic conflict, class conflict, violence in general, mobilization for legal and illegal political actions, identity (political, ethnic, and national), international diplomacy, human rights, Huntington's concept of civilizations, environmentalism, economic factors, and public school policy. In addition, these variables could be used to study the relationship of religion with any number of other factors not discussed or anticipated here.

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97. Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities."

98. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?"

99. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity."

100. For a discussion of the influence of Islam on ethnic conflict, see Fox, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict," and Kennedy, "Is One Person's Terrorist Another's Freedom Fighter? Western and Islamic Approaches to 'Just War' Compared."

101. The question of whether a state can be both democratic and religious is of particular importance in Israel. For further discussion of the topic, see Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, *Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: Secular-Religious Impasse* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Eliezer Don-Yehiyah, *Religion and Political Accommodation in Israel* (Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute, 1999); Charles S. Liebman, ed., *Religion, Democracy, and Israeli Society* (London: Hardwood Academic Publishers, 1997).

Third, these variables could be used to revisit previous quantitative studies on the influence of religion on various factors in order to either confirm or refute their findings. In doing so, they could hopefully provide more details on the nature of the relationship between religion and the issues these studies addressed. This would be especially useful in the case of Fox's study of the influence of religious legitimacy on ethnic conflict since some of the variables here are more sophisticated versions of the religious legitimacy variable used in that study.[102]

Fourth, if this data is collected at several points in time, it can also be used to study the rise, fall, and/or stability of religious influence on political institutions over time. This would be of general interest as well as of specific interest concerning the debate over secularization theory discussed earlier in this study.

Fifth, as noted above, this data would provide a general resource for anyone wishing to study the influence of religion on social, political, cultural, or economic factors as well as control for religion in studies focusing on other variables. This potential use of the data is perhaps the most important because it is potentially limitless. That is, it is impossible to anticipate the extent of topics on which religion might have a bearing that future researchers will investigate, much less the ways in which they will be able to use these variables to do so.

Sixth, more accurate data on religion will allow researchers interested in early warning measures for religion-related conflicts to make more accurate predictions. While early warning has its limitations,[103] it is a useful and necessary tool for policymakers in the modern era whose current capabilities need improvement.[104] Information on religion, which plays a role in many conflicts, will most likely add to the ability to predict future conflicts. This, in turn, will increase the likelihood that policymakers will be able to intervene in order to prevent or at least alleviate these conflicts.[105]

In all, the study of religious influence on political, social, cultural, and economic factors is becoming increasingly important. The goal of this work is to develop more accurate and practical means to measure religion on the state level in order to better assess this influence using a

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102. Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities."
103. Charles F. Doran, "Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics," *International Studies Review* 1 (2000): 11-41.
104. David Carment and Patrick James, "The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: New Perspectives on Theory and Policy," *Global Society* 11 (1997): 230-31.
105. Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, "Conceptual, Research and Policy Issues in Early Warning Research: An Overview," *Journal of Ethno-Development* 4 (1994): 3-14; and Barbara Harff and Ted R. Gurr, "Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies," *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (1998): 551-79.

quantitative, cross-sectional methodology. While the variables developed here are indirect and less than ideal, they are arguably the best practical means to achieve this goal given the complex theoretical and practical issues involved in quantifying religion, which is a phenomenon that is, perhaps, among the most unquantifiable.